

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE
NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY,
FLORIDA

PHILLIP PARKER,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT
OF HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR
VEHICLES, DIVISION OF DRIVER
LICENSES,

Respondent.

CASE NO.: 2010-CA-24282-O

Writ No.: 10-92

Petition for Writ of Certiorari
from the Florida Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,
Mary Varnadore, Hearing Officer.

Stuart I. Hyman, Esquire,
for Petitioner.

Kimberly A. Gibbs, Assistant General Counsel,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THORPE, O’KANE, MIHOK, J.J.

PER CURIAM.

FINAL ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Phillip Parker (“Parker” or “Petitioner”) seeks certiorari review of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles’ (“Department” or “Respondent”) final order sustaining the suspension of his driver’s license for driving with an unlawful breath alcohol level. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 322.2615(13), Florida Statutes and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(3).

Facts and Procedural History

On August 21, 2010, Parker was arrested for driving under the influence. Parker provided breath test results of 0.224 and 0.227 and his license was suspended. He requested a formal review hearing pursuant to section 322.2615, Florida Statutes, and a hearing was held on September 29, 2010.

At the hearing, Parker attempted to introduce documents related to the 2002 approval study of the Intoxilyzer 8000; transcripts of the testimony of FDLE Inspector Roger Skipper from a formal review hearing in other cases in 2006; a letter dated in 2006 from FDLE Custodian of Records Laura Barfield about Intoxilyzer software version 8100.26; numerous breath test results obtained from various Intoxilyzer 8000 machines using software 8100.26 and 8100.27 with testing dates from 2006 and 2007; and subpoenas for Roger Skipper, Laura Barfield, and FDLE Custodian of Records Jennifer Keegan that the hearing officer did not issue. On October 8, 2010, the hearing officer entered a written order sustaining Petitioner's license suspension.

Standard of Review

“The duty of the circuit court on a certiorari review of an administrative agency is limited to three components: Whether procedural due process was followed, whether there was a departure from the essential requirements of law, and whether the administrative findings and judgment were supported by competent substantial evidence.” *Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Satter*, 643 So. 2d 692, 695 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).

In a formal review of an administrative suspension, the burden of proof is on the State, through the Department. Where the driver license was suspended for driving with an unlawful

blood alcohol level, the hearing officer must find that the following elements have been established by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. Whether the arresting law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe that the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled substances.
2. Whether the person whose license was suspended had an unlawful blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or higher as provided in § 316.193.

§ 322.2615(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010).

Analysis

In the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Parker argues that: 1) there was not competent substantial evidence that he was driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle; 2) the hearing officer deprived him of due process of law when his license suspension was not set aside due to the failure of the hearing officer to issue subpoenas for Roger Skipper, Jennifer Keegan and Laura Barfield; 3) the breath test results were not properly approved because they were obtained by use of an unapproved breath testing machine and provided scientifically unreliable results; 4) the breath test results were inadmissible due to the failure of the record to contain the annual inspection report; 5) and the Intoxilyzer 8000 was improperly evaluated for approval. This Court denied the Petitions raising arguments (2) through (5) in *Klinker v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles*, 2010-CA-19788, Writ 10-70 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. Sept. 10, 2012) and *Morrow v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles*, 19 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 704a (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. Feb. 27, 2012).

I. No Competent Substantial Evidence the Petitioner was Driving or in Control of Vehicle

Parker argues that the officer's testimony and report stated that he observed a vehicle stuck on the railroad tracks and Parker was sitting in the driver's seat. Parker argues that there

was no evidence that the officers observed him operating the vehicle, no evidence that the vehicle was operable, and there were no keys present at the scene. Parker argues that his presence in the driver's seat without more was insufficient for the hearing officer to infer that he was in actual physical control of the vehicle.

The arrest report states that Officer Steven Keller observed a vehicle stuck on the railroad tracks. He observed Parker in the driver's seat and instructed him to exit the vehicle for safety. He noticed that Parker's speech was slurred and he staggered when he exited the vehicle. Officer Brent Fellows arrived on scene to assist and detected a strong odor of alcoholic beverage impurities coming from Parker's breath, noticed his eyes were bloodshot and glassy, and he swayed back and forth while standing. Parker admitted that he was traveling southbound on N. Orange Avenue when he made a mistake and he also admitted that he had some beers that night. There was no evidence that anyone else was present in the vehicle with Parker. Parker consented to performing field sobriety exercises and performed poorly.

Accordingly, the hearing officer had evidence of more than just Parker's presence in the driver's seat. Based on the above facts, there was competent substantial evidence to support the hearing officer's finding that the law enforcement officers had probable cause to believe that Parker was driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

II. Failure to Issue Subpoenas

As in *Klinker* and *Morrow*, Parker attempted to introduce documents concerning Intoxilyzer 8000 machines not used to administer his test and documents from tests administered in 2006 and 2007. Parker argues that Roger Skipper, Jennifer Keegan and Laura Barfield who were named in the documents he attempted to introduce at the hearing were necessary to

establish that the breath test machine upon which he was tested was not approved pursuant to FDLE Rules and the breath test machine was not working in a scientifically reliable manner.

Parker's breath test was administered on August 21, 2010. Therefore, the documents he attempted to introduce are not relevant to the issue in this case, whether the machine used to test his breath alcohol level on August 21, 2010 was an approved scientifically reliable machine. Parker is not entitled to present evidence that is not relevant to the issue before the hearing officer. *Lee v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles*, 4 So. 3d 754, 757 (a driver has the right to present evidence *relevant* to the issues when seeking review of a license suspension pursuant to section 322.2615 (emphasis added)).

III. Breath Test Results Were Not Properly Approved
V. Intoxilyzer 8000 Was Improperly Evaluated For Approval

The Department entered into the record the breath alcohol test affidavit indicating a breath alcohol level greater than 0.08 which is presumptive proof of the results. § 316.1934(5), Fla. Stat. (2010). Pursuant to Rule 11D-8.003(2), the Intoxilyzer 8000 is an approved instrument if it is used with software evaluated by FDLE in accordance with Instrument Evaluation Procedure FDLE/ATP Form 34. *Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Berne*, 49 So. 3d 779, 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). Parker did not present any evidence that software version 8100.27 was not evaluated by FDLE in accordance with FDLE/ATP Form 34. In addition, only an evaluation of the software is required, not approval. *Id.* at 780. Therefore, Parker failed to overcome the presumptive proof of impairment. *See Gurry v. Dept. of Highway Safety*, 902 So.2d 881, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); *Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Mowry*, 794 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

IV. Record Failed To Contain The Most Recent Department Inspection

Rule 11D-8.004(2) requires annual inspection of the breath test instruments. Rule 11D-8.006(1) requires inspection of the breath test instruments once each calendar month. Section

316.1934(5) states that the breath test affidavit is admissible without further authentication and is presumptive proof of the results of an authorized test to determine alcohol content of the breath if the affidavit discloses: “..... (e) If the test was administered by means of a breath testing instrument, the date of performance of the most recent required maintenance on such instrument.” The “most recent required maintenance” can be either the monthly or annual inspection, whichever is most recent. *State v. Buttolph*, 969 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Parker’s breath test was conducted on August 21, 2010. The date of the last agency inspection on the breath test affidavit is July 21, 2010. Parker did not present any evidence to demonstrate that the July 21, 2010 inspection was not the most recent inspection prior to the date of Parker’s breath test or that the inspection was not in compliance with the statutes and rules. Therefore, the hearing officer properly admitted the breath test results.

Based on the foregoing, there was competent substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s findings and Petitioner was not deprived of due process.

Accordingly, it is hereby **ORDERED AND ADJUDGED** that The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is **DENIED**.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Orlando, Orange County, Florida, this 17th day of October, 2012.

/S/ _____
JANET C. THORPE
Circuit Judge

/S/ _____
JULIE H. O’KANE
Circuit Judge

/S/ _____
A. THOMAS MIHOK
Circuit Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to: **Stuart I. Hyman, Esq.**, Stuart I. Hyman, P.A., 1520 East Amelia St., Orlando, Florida 32803 and to **Kimberly A. Gibbs, Assistant General Counsel**, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, P.O. Box 570066, Orlando, Florida 32857 on this 17th day of October, 2012.

/S/ _____
Judicial Assistant